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BALANCING COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH: WHY THE
COPYRIGHT EXTENSION ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Erwin Chemerinsky*
There is an inherent tension between copyright laws and free-
dom of speech. Copyrights restrict the ability of people to dissemi-
nate speech; when material is protected by copyright there are legal
limits on who can circulate or sell it. The First Amendment seeks to
maximize the dissemination of information. Put most simply, copy-
right laws create a cause of action, for money or even for an injunc-
tion, to publish speech. Any law that authorizes civil suits for speech
activities infringes the First Amendment unless it is sufficiently justi-
fied.' As Melville Nimmer observed, the copyright statute, by pun-
ishing expression, "fl[ies] directly in the face" of the First Amend-
ment.
2
Copyright laws are permitted, even in a society that deeply val-
ues freedom of speech, because they are seen overall as enhancing
expression. Authors and artists, to say nothing of publishers, often
engage in speech because of the likelihood of profit. Without copy-
right protections, less speech would occur.
* Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Public Interest Law, Legal Ethics, and
Political Science, University of Southern California. I want to thank David
Swift for his excellent research assistance.
1. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) ("What a
State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is
likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage awards
under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly
more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.").
2. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1181 (1970).
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A simple anecdote is illustrative. Several years ago, I wrote an
amicus curiae brief for the Ninth Circuit in the Napster case,3 argu-
ing that applying copyright laws in that situation enhanced speech.
Allowing distribution of copyrighted music without paying royalties
would lessen the incentives for musicians, their producers, and dis-
tributors to engage in speech activities. My teenage son was furious
at me for writing a brief against Napster. I tried to convince him
otherwise through a simple example. I had just written a constitu-
tional law casebook and frankly had the hope that it would help to
pay for his and his sibling's college tuition. I asked my son what
would happen if someone electronically scanned my book and put it
on the Internet for anyone to download for free. Not only would we
lose his college tuition, but authors in the future would have less in-
centive to write such books and certainly publishers would be less
inclined to produce them.
This, of course, is not a new notion. Professor Nimmer ex-
pressed this, too, when he wrote: "In some degree [copyright] en-
croaches upon freedom of speech.., but this is justified by the
greater public good in the copyright encouragement of creative
works." 4 Indeed, the Supreme Court described copyright law as "the
engine of free expression" which provides the economic incentives
for speech activities.
5
The tension between freedom of speech and copyright is an is-
sue now pending before the United States Supreme Court in Eldred
v. Ashcroft. 6 Eldred involves the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), which extends the terms of
existing and future copyrights by an additional twenty years.' Mate-
rial that otherwise would have been in the public domain, and thus
subject to widespread distribution, will be protected by copyright
laws for a significant number of years. The issue before the Supreme
Court is whether this statutory restriction on speech violates the First
Amendment.
3. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
2002).
4. Nimmer supra note 2, at 1192.
5. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985).
6. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (U.S. oral argument Oct. 9, 2002).
7. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
sec. 102, § 302, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998).
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My thesis is simply stated: Copyright protections are tolerated
under the First Amendment because they encourage speech. Extend-
ing copyright protections after the speech has occurred does not
serve this purpose. Therefore, such extensions should not be toler-
ated under the First Amendment. Although I favor enforcement of
copyright protections that existed when the work was created, be-
cause they were part of the incentive for the speech to have occurred,
I oppose extension of copyrights after the speech occurred because
extending copyrights has nothing to do with encouraging more
speech.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the Sonny Bono Copyright
Term Extension Act. Part II explains why the District of Columbia
Circuit decision was wrong in recognizing a categorical exemption
from First Amendment scrutiny for copyright laws. Part III offers a
framework for analyzing copyright laws under the First Amendment.
Finally, Part IV argues that under this framework the CTEA is un-
constitutional.8
I. THE SONNY BONO COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT
The Copyright Act of 1909 created a copyright term of twenty-
eight years, renewable once.9 In 1976, Congress amended the copy-
right law to extend this time period. The 1976 Act provided that the
basic term for copyright protections, for work created on or after
January 1, 1978, was the life of the author plus 50 years. 10 The Act,
however, said that for works made for hire and for anonymous or
pseudonymous works, the copyright term would be seventy-five
years. 1
8. There is another major reason why the CTEA is unconstitutional: The
Act exceeds the scope of Congress's powers under the Copyright Clause be-
cause that provision requires copyrights be granted only for "limited Times."
Retroactively extended copyright terms are not limited. Although this issue is
before the Supreme Court, and could be the basis for its decision, this Article
focuses on the First Amendment issue presented in Eldred v. Ashcroft.
9. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (current
version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-05).
10. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 302-04, 90 Stat.
2572-76 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 302(a) (1976)).
11. See id. at § 302(c) (stating that a work's copyright term will be seventy-
five years from the year of first publication, or 100 years from year of creation,
whichever expires first).
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The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act extends these
terms, both retroactively and prospectively. For any work published
before January 1, 1978, and still protected by copyright law on Octo-
ber 27, 1998, the Act extends the copyright term to ninety-five
years. 12 For works created on or after January 1, 1978, if the author
is a natural and known person, the copyright term will be the life of
the person plus seventy years. 13 The term will be the shorter of
ninety-five years from the year of first publication, or 120 years from
creation, if the work was made for hire or the author is anonymous or
pseudonymous. 14
Simply put, the Act adds an additional twenty years to the terms
of copyrights, both prospectively for works not yet created and retro-
actively for works already protected by copyright law. The result is
that many works that would have become part of the public domain
will continue to be protected by copyright law and thus have their
dissemination restricted.
II. WHY THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT WAS WRONG
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit rejected a First Amendment challenge to the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act.15 The court held that copyright laws
are immune from First Amendment challenge and scrutiny. 16 The
court declared that "copyrights are categorically immune from chal-
lenges under the First Amendment."' 17 The court stated: "[we reject
their first amendment objection to the CTEA because the plaintiffs
lack any cognizable first amendment right to exploit the copyrighted
works of others."18
No Supreme Court decision has ever held that copyright laws
are absolutely immune from First Amendment challenges. The lead-
ing Supreme Court decision concerning copyright and the First
12. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298,
sec. 102(d)(1)(B), § 304, 112 Stat. 2827, 2828 (1998).
13. See id. at sec. 102(b)(l), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827.
14. See id. at secs. 102(b)(3)(A)-(B), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827.
15. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d at 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. granted
sub nom., Eldred v. Ashcroft 122 S. Ct. 1062 (Feb. 19, 2002).
16. See id. at375.
17. Id. (quoting the holding of United Video v. FCC, 890 F.2d 1173, 1192
(D.C. Cir. 1989)).
18. Id. at 376.
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Amendment is Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises.1 9 The Court
held that a magazine could be held liable for publishing copyrighted
material. The Court said that the First Amendment does not protect
the right to publish speech owned by another. 20 An article in The
Nation magazine contained 300-400 words from a 200,000 word
manuscript written by former President Gerald Ford and that had
been under contract for publication, in excerpt form, in Time maga-
212zine. 1 Time canceled its contract after The Nation article appeared.2
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not pro-
tect The Nation from liability for copyright infringement. Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, said that "in our haste to dissemi-
nate news, it should not be forgotten that the Framers intended copy-
right itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a
marketable right to use of one's expression, copyright supplies the
economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas." 23 The Court
also rejected the argument that the publication should be considered
to be "fair use" under the copyright law. Justice O'Connor said:
In view of the First Amendment protections already embod-
ied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyright-
able expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and
the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally af-
forded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public fig-
ure exception to copyright.24
Nothing in Harper & Row states or even implies that copyright
laws are inherently categorically exempt from First Amendment
scrutiny. Quite the contrary, the Court in Harper & Row emphasized
the relationship between freedom of speech and copyright laws.25
The Nation magazine urged the Supreme Court to recognize a First
Amendment exception to copyright law for news reporting that used
copyrighted materials. The Supreme Court expressly rejected this
argument and emphasized "the First Amendment protections already
19. 471 U.S. 539 (1984).
20. See id. at 560.
21. See id. at 539.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 558.
24. Id. at 560.
25. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 554-60.
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embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable
expression and noncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for
scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use."
26
In other words, the Court upheld the application of the copyright
law, and rejected an exception to it, because it saw copyright protec-
tions as protecting and advancing speech. Nothing in the opinion
suggests that copyright laws are immune from First Amendment
analysis or that they would be upheld if they were seen as unduly re-
stricting expression.
Harper & Row is best understood together with other Supreme
Court decisions that have allowed civil liability for speech so as to
protect commercial value and encourage more speech. In Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the Court held that a state may
allow liability for invasion of this right when a television station
broadcast a tape of an entire performance without the performer's au-
thorization.27 A television station broadcast a fifteen-second tape of
a circus county fair act where an individual was a "human cannon-
ball" shot from a cannon into a net. 28 The Supreme Court held that
the broadcast station could be held liable because it broadcast the en-
tire performance without the plaintiff's authorization. 29 The Court
noted, however, that the plaintiff would have to prove damages and
noted that it was quite possible that "respondent's news broadcast in-
creased the value of petitioner's performance by stimulating the pub-
lic's interest in seeing the act live." 30 The Zacchini Court empha-
sized that "the State's interest is closely analogous to the goals of
patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the individual to
reap the reward of his endeavors."
31
Both Harper & Row and Zacchini allowed restrictions of speech
because the limitations were seen as enhancing speech overall by
protecting the economic incentive for expression. Neither stated or
implied a categorical exception to the First Amendment. Nor, of
course, did either involve a retroactive extension of the protections
accorded by copyright law or the right of publicity.
26. Id. at 560.
27. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 574-75.
30. Id. at 575 n.12.
31. Id. at 573.
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The District of Columbia Circuit also justified its conclusion by
invoking the idea/expression distinction. The court quoted its earlier
decision in United Video, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion:
32
In the present case, the petitioners desire to make commer-
cial use of the copyrighted works of others. There is no
[F]irst [A]mendment right to do so. Although there is some
tension between the Constitution's copyright clause and the
[F]irst [A]mendment, the familiar idea/expression dichot-
omy of copyright law, under which ideas are free but their
particular expression can be copyrighted, has always been
held to give adequate protection to free expression.
33
The extension of the term of the copyright law has little to do
with the idea/expression distinction. When a copyright expires, both
the ideas and expression contained within it become part of the pub-
lic domain. A person is able to publish and disseminate the material,
without permission from the copyright holder. Extension of the
copyright law takes this right to speech away. The fact that the ideas
within the work are not copyrighted does not diminish the speech
that is lost as a result of the copyright extension. Phrased slightly
differently, there is an enormous difference between what is allowed
under fair use and what is allowed if material is no longer regarded
as protected by copyright. The Copyright Term Extension Act
means that material that otherwise would not be covered by copy-
right laws will be deemed protected for twenty additional years. This
is a substantial loss of speech and neither the idea/expression dichot-
omy nor the fair use doctrine lessen the impact of the CTEA.
III. ANALYZING COPYRIGHT LAWS UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
In the last twenty years, the Supreme Court has been clear that
the starting point in free speech analysis is whether a law is content-
based or content-neutral. 34 The Supreme Court frequently has de-
clared that the very core of the First Amendment is that the govern-
ment cannot regulate speech based on its content.35 In Police Dep't
32. 890 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
33. Id. at 1191.
34. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
35. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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of Chicago v. Mosley, for example, the Court said: "[a]bove all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content." 36 In countless First Amendment cases, involving many dif-
ferent types of speech issues, the Court has invoked the con-
tent-based/content-neutral distinction as the basis for its decisions.
The Court has declared that "[c]ontent-based regulations are
presumptively invalid., 37 In Turner Broadcasting System v. Federal
Communications Commission, the Court said that the general rule is
that content-based restrictions on speech must meet strict scrutiny,
while content-neutral regulations only need to meet intermediate
scrutiny.38 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, explained that
"[g]overnment action that stifles speech on account of its message, or
that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the
Government, contravenes this essential [First Amendment] right."
39
Justice Kennedy thus noted: "For these reasons, the First Amend-
ment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions, does
not countenance governmental control over the content of messages
expressed by private individuals. '" 40 Hence, the Court endorsed a
two-tier system of review. The Court uses "the most exacting scru-
tiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential
burdens upon speech because of its content.' 41 However, "[iun con-
trast, regulations that are unrelated to the content of speech are sub-
ject to an intermediate level of scrutiny."
42
The Court's concern is that the government will target particular
messages and attempt to control thoughts on a topic by regulating
speech.43 As the Court recently noted, "[f]aws of this sort pose the
inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate
regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or to
manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than
36. Id. at 95.
37. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1982).
38. 512 U.S. 622 (1994), affid, 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
39. Id. at 641.
40. Id.
41. Id. at642.
42. Id.
43. See Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv.
46 (1987) (for an excellent discussion of the rule of content-neutrality).
[Vol. 36:83
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persuasion." 44 As the Supreme Court explained, content-based re-
strictions "rais[e] the specter that the government may effectively
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.
'" 45
How is it determined if a law is content-based? The requirement
that the government be content-neutral in its regulation of speech
means that the government must be both viewpoint neutral and sub-
ject matter neutral.46 Viewpoint neutral means that the government
cannot regulate speech based on the ideology of the message.47 For
example, it would be clearly unconstitutional for the government to
say that pro-choice demonstrations are allowed in the park but anti-
abortion demonstrations are not allowed.
Subject matter neutral means that the government cannot regu-
late speech based on the topic of the speech. A case from two dec-
ades ago, Carey v. Brown, is illustrative.48 Chicago adopted an ordi-
nance prohibiting all picketing in residential neighborhoods unless it
was labor picketing connected to a place of employment. 4  The Su-
preme Court held this regulation unconstitutional. The Court ex-
plained that the law allowed speech if it was about the subject of la-
bor, but not otherwise. 50 The Court said that whenever the
government attempts to regulate speech in public places it must be
subject matter neutral.'
Similarly, and more recently, in United States v. Playboy Enter-
tainment Group, Inc., the Court found that a law which regulated
only sexual speech was a subject matter restriction and had to meet
strict scrutiny. 52  A provision of the federal Cable Act prohibited
"signal bleed" of sexual images; signal bleed occurs when people
44. Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 641.
45. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983).
47. See Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can it Play an Appropriate
Role in Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J. 1209, 1220-22
(1993).
48. 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
49. See id. at 457.
50. See id. at 460 n.4 (noting that the lower courts have interpreted the stat-
ute as embodying the requirement that the subject of picketing be related to the
labor dispute).
51. See id. at 471.
52. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
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receive images from cable stations to which they do not subscribe. 53
The law required that cable companies either completely eliminate
signal bleed of sexual images or that sexual programming be shown
exclusively during late-night hours. 54 In finding the law unconstitu-
tional, Justice Kennedy declared: "The speech in question is defined
by its content; and the statute which seeks to restrict it is content
based." 55 He explained that the law
applies only to channels primarily dedicated to "sexually
explicit adult programming or other programming that is
indecent." 56 The statute is unconcerned with signal bleed
from any other channels.... It "focuses only on the con-
tent of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on
its listeners., 57 This is the essence of content-based regula-
tion.
58
The Court found that the law failed strict scrutiny because it was
not the least restrictive alternative for achieving the government's in-
terest.
59
A law regulating speech is content-neutral if it applies to all
speech regardless of the message. For example, a law prohibiting the
posting of all signs on public utility poles would be content-neutral
because it would apply to every sign regardless of its subject matter
or viewpoint. In Turner Broadcasting v. Federal Communications
Commission, the Supreme Court found that a federal law requiring
cable companies to carry local broadcast stations was content-neutral
because they were required to include all stations whatever their pro-
gramming.60 A law might also be content-neutral if it regulates con-
duct and it has an effect on speech without regard to its content. For
example, a sales tax, applicable to all purchases including reading
53. See id. at 806.
54. See id. at 808.
55. Id. at811.
56. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 505, 110
Stat 56.
57. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 318, 321 (1988).
58. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 811-12.
59. See id. at 827.
60. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
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material, might have a significant incidental effect on speech, but it
is content-neutral. 6'
The question, therefore, is whether copyright laws should be re-
garded as content-based or content-neutral. In an important and in-
fluential article, Professor Neil Netanel makes a persuasive argument
that copyright laws are content-neutral and thus only need to meet in-
termediate scrutiny under Turner Broadcasting.62 Professor Netanel
writes: "Copyright law stands outside this content-based rubric.
Copyright's purpose is to provide an economic incentive for creation
and dissemination of original expression. Its target is not the view-
point, subject matter, or even communicative impact of the in-
fringer's speech, but rather the infringement's deleterious impact on
the copyright incentive."
63
Professor Netanel is exactly right in his analysis. Professors
Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh came to an opposite conclusion
and concluded that copyright laws are content-based because
"[c]opyright liability turns on the content of what is published. 64
Although, of course, this statement is true, it fails to recognize that
"content-based" is a term of art within the First Amendment analysis
and has a specific meaning in that context. Under the Supreme
Court's precedents described above, a law is content-based if its ap-
plication depends on either the subject matter or the viewpoint of the
speech. Copyright law does neither of these: it applies to all speech
whatever its topic and whatever its ideology. As Professor Netanel
explained: "But the fact that copyright law is content-sensitive does
not mean that it is 'content-based' within the meaning of the First
Amendment."
65
Certainly, it is possible to imagine a content-based copyright
law. Imagine that the law extended different degrees of protection or
different terms of protection based on the topic of the speech or its
61. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (upholding the ap-
plication of a general sales tax to cable television that was not applicable to
newspapers because the tax did not suppress ideas and did not target a small
group of speakers).
62. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First
Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1, 48, 54-59 (2001).
63. Id. at 49.
64. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions
in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 186 (1998).
65. Netanel, supra note 61, at 48.
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viewpoint. If the law provided less copyright protection for works
about law than for books about science, or longer terms of protection
for works praising the government than for works criticizing it, that
would be content-based. General copyright statutes are properly re-
garded as content-neutral and thus should have to meet intermediate
scrutiny.
A key question then becomes what is to be regarded as an "im-
portant" interest sufficient to meet intermediate scrutiny. In the area
of copyright law, an important purpose is encouraging the creation of
new works. The Copyright Clause itself, in Article I of the Constitu-
tion, states that "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"
Congress may "secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.,
66
This language is crucial because it explains how the First Amend-
ment and the copyright clause can be reconciled. If there is a conflict
between these two provisions, then the First Amendment would have
to trump because it modified the Constitution by subsequent enact-
ment as an amendment. A tension does not exist so long as intellec-
tual property law is used "to promote" creation and dissemination of
works. In this way, the Copyright Clause enhances and increases
speech.
For this reason, the Supreme Court has explained that copyrights
exist to protect "original" works. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co., the Court declared: "Originality is a consti-
tutional requirement." 67 When copyright protections are accorded to
original works they provide an incentive for its creation. 68 Extending
copyright protection for existing works does not offer such an incen-
tive.
Thus, in evaluating copyright law, intermediate scrutiny is to be
used and, more specifically, the question is whether the statute will
likely have the effect of increasing the creation and distribution of
speech.
66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
67. 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
68. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law, 42
B.C. L. REv. 1, 35 (2000) (restrictions of speech are permitted to encourage
more speech).
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IV. WHY THE COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Retroactively extending the term for copyrights does not offer
an incentive for creating or distributing speech. The speech that
benefits from copyright extension obviously already has occurred.
But copyright extension limits speech by preventing expression that
otherwise would occur. For this reason, the Copyright Term Exten-
sion Act should be deemed to fail intermediate scrutiny and thus to
violate the First Amendment.
There are several responses to this conclusion. First, it could be
argued that this unduly limited the goals of copyright law to just pro-
viding an economic incentive for speech. Copyright protection also
serves another crucial purpose: upholding the moral rights of the
creator of a work. The idea is that those who produce creative works
deserve to be the ones to profit from them. The argument, then, is
that copyright extension is warranted as advancing the moral rights
of authors and artists.
At the very least, it is highly questionable whether this was the
purpose of the CTEA.69 That law seemed to be about allocating fi-
nancial benefits; advancing moral rights did not seem to play any
role in this. The reality, of course, is that the beneficiary of copy-
right extension is rarely the artist or author who created the work.
The CTEA seemed all about protecting studios and publishers who
have the copyright, not at all about upholding the moral rights of the
creator.
Also, the moral rights argument has no stopping point. Any
copyright protection advances these interests of speakers. The ques-
tion is how to balance the moral rights of the producer of expression
with the interests of the general public in the widest possible dis-
semination of speech. Copyright law does this when applied pro-
spectively by giving authors and artists notice as to the protections
that they will have. Retroactive extension is a windfall, benefiting
69. The Supreme Court has held that under both intermediate and strict
scrutiny the focus is exclusively on the actual purpose of the legislature; a con-
ceivable purpose is not sufficient. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 533 (1996) (under intermediate scrutiny, the government has the burden
of proof and the focus is on the actual purpose of the law); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986) (describing requirements for strict
scrutiny).
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one group-the copyright holders, who may or likely may not be the
producers, at the expense of another group-those who want wider
dissemination of the speech.
Second, it can be argued that copyright is really property, and
government regulation of this property should be treated under the
rational basis test used for other government economic regulations
since 1937. From this perspective, copyright extension is like any
other government regulation; it favors some economically over oth-
ers.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores that the prop-
erty involved are works protected by the First Amendment. The ar-
gument assumes that there are two distinct categories: property and
speech. That is a false dichotomy. Copyright is all about safeguard-
ing property that is speech. In this way, labeling the works as prop-
erty changes nothing in terms of the appropriate content of First
Amendment analysis. Nor should rational basis review be applied
simply because the law is concerned with allocating economic bene-
fits. A tax on newspapers is about economics, but still is highly sus-
pect under the First Amendment. 70 Indeed, copyright extension
functions much like a tax on the press. It imposes a new economic
cost on those wanting to engage in speech activities; now there must
be royalties if the speech is to occur at all (and even then might not
be allowed).
Third, it can be argued that copyright extension is constitutional
because it provides the resources for producers to engage in more
speech activity. If major studios have longer copyright protections,
they can reap additional profits from the copyrighted works. These
funds then can be used to produce more speech. This argument is
particularly attractive because it justifies copyright extension as con-
sistent with the Constitution's purposes: increasing speech.
There are several problems with this argument. First, it is purely
speculative. Those benefiting from additional years of copyright
might use the funds that they gain for more speech or they might use
it in an infinite number of other ways. There is no way to know. A
studio benefiting from copyright extension might use the additional
revenues for another movie, or it might profit the parent company, or
70. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Reve-
nue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
(declaring unconstitutional a tax on the press).
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be used for higher salaries and dividends. There is no reason to be-
lieve that it will lead to a substantial increase in speech. Actually,
the inquiry is more complicated. Copyright extension only will lead
to more speech if either it would subsidize speech that otherwise
would not occur because it was not profitable or because, though
profitable, was not able to attract sufficient capital. Probably such
instances exist, but how often is completely a guess.
Second, there is no way to evaluate whether the speech that is
gained by copyright protection exceeds the speech that is lost. As-
suming that copyright extension by granting more profits to copy-
right holders will cause them to produce more speech, there still is
the question of whether this outweighs the speech that is lost by re-
moving works from the public domain. Indeed, those who could
benefit economically without copyright extension-such as publish-
ers and film distributors-are just as likely to use their profits for
more speech. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that copyright
extension will cause a net increase in speech compared to what
would occur without the extension.
V. CONCLUSION
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act is a law that
gives an economic benefit to some, copyright holders, at the expense
of others, those who would benefit from the material being in the
public domain. By taking material from the public domain for
twenty additional years, the Act is a substantial restriction on the
freedom of expression. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court
should hold that the law violates the First Amendment.
Copyright law is consistent with the First Amendment when it
exists to encourage the creation and distribution of more speech.
Copyright extension does not serve that purpose because it applies
only to speech that already exists. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
should find that the law is impermissible and that Congress cannot
retroactively extend the terms for copyrights.
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